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INTRODUCTION
Over the past generation, there has been a long line of studies,
committees, commissions, et cetera-a Baker's dozen, pun intended-
which have focused on the United States Courts of Appeals, to assess
their status, to evaluate the harms from their increasing workload, and to
make recommendations for their reform. The Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, better known as the
White Commission, queues up behind all these predecessor efforts.
This chronology is intended to be more expository than analytical.!
My modest goal is merely to collect and to synthesize the findings of
those previous studies-to describe their common sense of institutional
crisis rather than to set out independently to define the threshold of crisis
or to prove that it has been exceeded.2 In this area of public policy, the
routinely repeated perception is that the caseload has come to threaten
the federal appellate ideal and therefore some reform is needed. Indeed,
it is interesting just how much basic agreement there has been over the
See generally Thomas E. Baker, A Bibliography for the United States Courts of Appeals, 25
TEx TECH L. REV. 335 (1994) (enumerating "all books and articles dealing with the United
States Courts of Appeals available through June 1993"); Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium of
Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 225 (1985)
(examining effects that increased workloads have had on role of federal intermediate courts
and reform measures taken to address this occurrence).
2 "However people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its
appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions
they were even a generation ago." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109
(Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMrrrEE REPORT]; see also DANIEL J. MEADOR,
APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974) (proposing
development of new approaches to appellate review in face of increasing caseloads).
"Crisis" is a much overused word. Burgeoning caseloads are nothing new, nor
is the sense that the system is on the verge of breakdown. What is new is the
perception that the traditional remedies-enlarging the number of judgeships
and auxiliary staff, creating new courts, or subdividing existing courts into
smaller units-are no longer adequate.
Arthur D. Hellman, Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the Browning Years, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 4 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); see also Christopher F. Carlton,
The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing the Federal Courts for the
Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1997) (suggesting adoption of reform
measures to mitigate problems arising from increased caseloads in federal appellate
courts); Martha J. Dragich, Once A Century: Time for A Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WiS. L. REv. 11, 12-13 (1996) (noting that although indications of appellate
court success continue to exist, weight of opinion holds that crisis is "brewing, if not
developed"); Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 J. DISP. RESOL.
115 (1991) (discussing relationship between Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and "crisis" of
federal appellate courts' increased caseloads); Symposium, Crisis in the Courts?, TRIAL,
Apr. 1993, 19-51 (1993) (exploring topics related to effectiveness of United States court
system).
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years. These previous studies have been conducted by leading court
experts from multiple disciplines, using various evaluative
methodologies. While their evidence and documentation are far too
voluminous to be canvassed in the space of a few pages, their
conclusions can be faithfully summarized and their recommendations
can be compared in an effort to better understand all that has gone
before. My fundamental premise is that this history is important context
and necessary background against which to understand, in turn, the
conclusions and recommendations of the White Commission.
I. AMERICAN LAW INSTITrrTE
The first modem study of federal jurisdiction may be credited to Chief
Justice Earl Warren. In a 1959 speech to the American Law Institute, he
challenged, "[i]t is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional
balance between the Federal and State court systems assigning to each
system those cases most appropriate in light of basic principles of
federalism." 4 The ALI Study begun in 1960, was completed in 1968 and
published under the title Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between
State and Federal Courts.! This far-reaching effort focused primarily on
the district courts and their major heads of subject matter jurisdiction.
Taking the Chief Justice's theme, the ALI Study sought to redraw the
federal/state judicial relation "in a rational and contemporarily useful
way."6  The proposals, for the most part, did not anticipate the
burgeoning federal dockets. The ALI Study has little to offer this
discussion, except for the fundamental demand-reduction proposition
that a narrowing of federal jurisdiction at the district court would
necessarily decrease the case load demand on appellate resources.
Nothing significant came of the ALI Study7 and it may be dismissed
8today as academic. The implied assumption of the court insiders at the
time was, naive in hindsight, that the Judicial Conference of the United
States and Congress could seemingly forever continue to create new
circuit judgeships on an ad hoc basis to keep up with caseload growth
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Address to the 36th Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute (May 20, 1959), in A.L.I. Proceedings 27,33 (1959).
1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
6 Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed Course of
Action, 1981 BYU L. REV. 617,625.
7 Id.
I Cf. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, at iv (5th ed. 1994)
(noting frequency with which reference to ALI Study appears in that volume).
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without any untoward consequences.9
HI. AMERICAN BAR FoUNDATION
The American Bar Foundation commissioned the first study to focus
specifically on the burgeoning federal appellate caseload.'0 Published in
1968, the report, entitled Accommodating the Workload of the United
States Courts of Appeals," recommended some intramural reforms to
improve efficiency, and recommended an increase in appellate capacity.
Most importantly for present purposes, the report proposed the
following sequential strategy for dealing with the newly dawning reality
of accelerating federal appellate growth over the long run. 12 Once a
circuit reaches nine judges, the desirability of adding more judges should
be compared to the alternative of splitting a circuit to create a new
circuit, although, on balance, it is more desirable to add judges than it is
to split circuits. When the number of judges in a given circuit exceeds
fifteen, a "division" system should be adopted to assign judges on a
rotating basis to decide appeals docketed by the subject.3 The division
arrangement might accommodate as many as thirty judges on a court of
appeals. Eventually some circuits will have to be split when the caseload
exceeds the capacity of the maximum number of judges who can be
efficiently employed under a "substantive divisions" organization.4 As
the caseload grows and the number of circuit judges increases, the
Supreme Court will need assistance in its role to guide and harmonize
the federal law. This need for harmony might be furnished alternatively
by regional appellate panels of the courts of appeals, by appellate panels
with jurisdiction over specific matter, or by a "national circuit" that
would resolve regional conflicts in the national law.
BAKER, supra note *, at 53-54.
10 See generally Quentin N. Burdick, Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or
Conservative Care, 60 KY. L.J. 807, 813-15 (1972) (tracing history of American Bar
Foundation's special Task Force's attempts to solve problem of accommodating increased
number of judges in federal appellate system).
n AMERICAN BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNnTED STATES
COuRTS OF APPEALS (1968).
12 Burdick, supra note 10, at 814. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 542, 604-17 (1969) (criticizing use of specialized courts and formation of new national
court). Professor Carrington was the Project Director of the Advisors to the American Bar
Foundation Study of the United States Courts of Appeals. See id. at 542 n.al.
13 AMERICAN BAR FOUND., supra note 11, at 5.
14 Carrington, supra note 12, at 590.
[Vol. 34:395
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Today, by century's end, much of this sequential scenario has already
come to pass and the remainder continues to be viable. Notice, for
example, the conception of internally reorganizing the larger circuits into
subdivisions. Here too we also see the characteristic ambivalence, even
reluctance, about moving away from the generalist appellate court, in the
direction of specialized appellate subject matter jurisdiction. It also is
interesting to observe, almost quaint in retrospect, how the "nine judge
barrier" was swept away by the reality of appellate workload trends.'5
Many judges and members of Congress had long shared an almost
mystical kind of numerology that the number of Supreme Court Justices
was the absolute maximum number of judges that could operate as a
single appellate court, that "nine" was a judicial constant like the speed
of sound in physics. 16 The debate persists, in theory and in practice,
whether there really is some upper limit on the number of circuit judges
who can constitute a single court of appeals.
III. THE FREUND COMMrTrEE
The Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court
was published in 1972.17 Commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center,
the Study Group of jurists, scholars, and attorneys came informally to be
called after the name of its chair, Harvard's Professor Paul Freund. As
its formal title suggests, however, the study focused primarily on the
problems of the Supreme Court.i"
The Freund Committee recommended several efficiency measures,
such as the elimination of the three-judge district courts and the repeal of
the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction.'9 One suggestion for
systemic appellate capacity reform, that Congress create a national court
of appeals, was met with a hailstorm of controversy and criticism.E°Briefly described, the proposed new court would be staffed by seven
11 DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAs G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE Fri-T CIRcurr
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 2-7 (1988).
6 d. at 5.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, (1972) (reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573).
" Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, as Chairman of the Board, appointed the group to
"study the caseload of the Supreme Court and to make such recommendations as its
findings warranted." Id. at 576.
19 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 25-38.
For a partial bibliography of the extended debate, see Kevin L. Domecus,
Congressional Prerogatives, The Constitution and a National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 715, 716 n.7 (1978), and J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit
Conflicts: A Solution Neededfor a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 914 n.9 (1983).
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circuit judges sitting for staggered three-year terms. The proposed court
would screen all certiorari petitions and appeals and refer only about 500
to the Supreme Court for the high Court's final selection of the
approximately 150-200 cases the Supreme Court was accepting back then
for full decision each Term.21 Additionally, the proposed court would
retain and decide genuine conflicts among the circuits. These court
experts felt the need for more national appellate capacity to maintain the
desirable level of uniformity in federal law.22
Criticism essentially centered around two themes: a concern for the
dilution of Supreme Court authority and self-determinism, and a desire
to preserve direct access to the Supreme Court. Seen by some as an
attack on the Supreme Court itself, the proposal was "stillborn," to quote
the diagnosis of a career midwife of federal court reform. 2 Indeed, the
episode tended to reaffirm the lasting precedent of FDR's notorious
failed attempt at Supreme Court packing: federal court reforms must
show reat respect and deference for the power and prestige of the High
Court. The episode did serve to focus attention on the federal appellate
court system and its problems, however, and established some important
defacto political limits on the dialogue of reform of the courts of appeals
and the federal circuits.25 It may not be unfair to observe that the
experience of the Freund Committee demonstrates that thoughtful,
informed study groups may sometimes hatch a genuinely goofy
proposal. When reading one of these reports, we should apply a healthy
skepticism to its assumptions and we should subject its proposals to a
full debate.
IV. THE HRusKA COMMISSION
Responding to the collective urgings of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
the Chief Judges of all the Courts of Appeals, the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, and the American Bar
Association, Congress created the Commission on Revision of the
26Federal Court Appellate System in 1972. Chaired by Senator Hruska,
21 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 17, at 18-24.
= Id. at 18.
Meador, supra note 6, at 627.
14 WILLUAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBoRN-THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-162 (1995).
' Meador, supra note 6, at 627.
' Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See generally H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 92-1457 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3611 (explaining effect of establishment
of Commission); S. REP. NO. 92-930, at 6-7 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3602, 3605-
[Vol. 34:395
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the Commission included foursomes from the Senate, the House, the
Chief Justice's appointees, and the President's appointees. Although
subject matter jurisdiction was explicitly placed off limits, the legislative
charge was broad: to study the federal judicial system's geographical
divisions, structure, and internal procedures and to recommend changes
"most appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of
judicial business. "2
In 1973, the Commission issued its first report recommending the
division of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.8 This report also emphasized
various efficiency reforms. Two years later, the Commission issued its
second report, which considered the organization, structure and internal
procedures of the federal appellate court system.2 Again, one of the
recommendations was the appellate capacity reform of the creation of a
national court of appeals. 3° To be inserted between the courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court, the proposed new court would have been
staffed permanently with seven Article III judges. It would not perform
any screening duties for the Supreme Court, the feature that doomed the
Freund Committee recommendation, but the proposed new court would
decide cases referred by the Supreme Court or transferred from the
existing appellate courts. It would be subject to review in the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari. Aside from the split of the Fifth Circuit, which
finally occurred in 1981, the Hruska Commission proposals did not fare
very well in the legislative halls.31 They did garner relatively more
attention within the ivy-covered walls, both favorable and unfavorable.32
The influence of the Freund Committee on the Hruska Commission is
obvious, even in this brief summary. In the long line of studies, reform
proposals come into fashion and go out of fashion among legal
06 (discussing broadened scope of study referred to Commission, created by act H.R. 7378).
Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489,86 Stat. 807.
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE, reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973).
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195
(1975).
Id. at 237-47.
31 BAKER, supra note *, at 52-73 (Fifth Circuit split); Meador, supra note 6, at 628 (noting
fate of Hruska Commission proposals).
' See, e.g., Charles R. Haworth & Daniel J. Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate
Appellate Court, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 201 (1978); Roman L. Hruska, The Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System: A Legislative History, 1974 ARIz. ST. L.J. 579;
Luther M. Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51
IND. L.J. 327 (1976).
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commentators in a way that resembles the "what's hot - what's not" lists
in popular magazines. This may be partly due to the general fickleness
which the legal intellegencia shares with readers of People magazine.
Likewise, these trends may be attributed to a particular sense of judicial
realpolitik that thinks of previously-overlooked proposals as being
damaged goods.
V. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE
The little-known and often-overlooked Advisory Council on Appellate
Justice ("Advisory Council") was a nongovernmental body created in
1971 as a liaison to the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center
for State Courts.3 After a four-year study, the Advisory Council,
comprised of judges, lawyers, and law professors, developed guidelines
for restructuring the federal appellate system much in line with the
recommendations from the Hruska Commission. The Hruska
Commission more or less overshadowed the work of the Council. The
various efforts to study and report on the courts of appeals are related
much like a set of amicus curiae briefs in a case on appeal: they line up on
the same side of the issues; they repeat many of the same arguments; and
they reach many of the same conclusions.
In retrospect, it is around this time that would-be-reformers began to
uncouple the Supreme Court from the courts of appeals in their thinking
about federal appellate restructuring. The next generation of proposals
for structural reform sought to redesign the middle tier federal court.
Tampering with the Supreme Court had become the lethal third rail of
judicial policymaking.
VI. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ACTION COMMISSION
The American Bar Association ("ABA") generally supported the
Hruska Commission.3 In 1978, the ABA created the Action Commission
to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, which in turn developed a package of
appellate reforms to expedite the disposition of appeals.36 Its intramural
proposals were concerned exclusively with appeal processing efficiency,
however, and were addressed to how the judges could do better and do
I Meador, supra note 6, at 628-29.
3 Id.
3 Id.
' Seth Hufstedler & Paul Nejelski, ABA Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost
and Delay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965 (1980).
[Vol. 34:395
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more.
This, too, has been a common theme in the literature over the years:
that intramural reforms, modifications in the procedures used to hear
and decide appeals, promise ever greater efficiencies.3 This aspect of
judicial politics is somewhat reminiscent of the utopian notion that
science and technology will solve all the world's problems. This naivet6
about the future of the courts is all the more amazing, however, when
one looks to the past and realizes that "[t]he history of procedure is a
series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding
generation's procedural reforms." 39
VII. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Appointed by then-Attorney General Edward Levi, a committee
within the Department of Justice, chaired by then-Solicitor General
Robert Bork, surveyed the problems of the federal courts and issued a
Report in 1977.40 The Report emphasized the problems of the whole
federal court system and made several recommendations: the abolition
of diversity jurisdiction; the creation of administrative courts under
Article I for adjudication and appeals under most federal regulatory
laws; the elimination of the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction; and
the creation of a permanent interbranch "Council on Federal Courts" to
plan and coordinate judicial reforms.4' Because of the quick change
between the Ford and Carter administrations, however, these proposals
failed to gain any traction inside the Executive Branch.42 One may
wonder whether a permanent, on-going study group would come to
different conclusions or come up with different ideas than the regular,
though ad hoc series of studies that in fact have been undertaken over
the years.
In 1977, then-Attorney General Bell established a new unit within the
Department called the Office for Improvements in the Administration of
Justice (the "Office").4 The Office was designed to develop and promote
See generally Joseph R. Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31
AM. U. L. REV. 237 (1982).
BAKER, supra note *, at 166-72.
Judith Resnik, Preclusion in a Federal System: Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv.
603, 624 (1985).
o See DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE
NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977).
"3 See id.
', Meador, supra note 6, at 630-31.
' See 42 Fed. Reg. 8140 (1977).
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court reforms and it achieved a fair degree of legislative success. 4 The
most noteworthy appellate reform originating in this Office was the
proposal, eventually enacted in 1982, to create the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the first ever intermediate federal appellate court
with a nationwide subject matter jurisdiction.4 Some court reformers
deem this successful example of a subject matter appellate court as the
harbinger of the future." Other reformers see it as only the exception
that proves the rule in favor of courts of appeals of general subject matter
jurisdiction. 47  Tax cases and social security appeals are most often
mentioned as potential subjects for further appellate specialization."
Yet, their numbers do not promise very much docket relief for the
regional courts of appeals. Instead, there ought to be independent, valid
reasons for a court of specialized jurisdiction.
These two efforts by the Justice Department illustrate another
characteristic of the various studies of the courts of appeals: court reform
is bipartisan. Perhaps better stated, court reform is nonpartisan. This is
not to suggest that court reformers never have hidden political agendas,
of course. Rather, my point is that court reform has an inherently low
level of political interest. Executive branch initiatives, more often than
not, are a low priority in any administration. In the legislative branch, it
is difficult to get anyone in Congress, on either side of the aisle, to pay
any attention to the needs of the federal courts. Court reform is not the
stuff of headlines.
VIII. THE NYU STUDY
In 1986, professors Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton published a
short book49 that presented the findings of the New York University Law
Review Project ("NYU Study")i0 That project had focused on the
Supreme Court's caseload and the book argued for a new "managerial
" See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643
(amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 604(d)(3), 631-636, 1915 (1976));.
' Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
581 (1992).
46 See id.
4' BAKER, supra note *, at 221-24, 261-68.
Meador, supra note 45, at 586.
49 SAMUEL EsTREIcHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale Univ. Press 1986). For a critical review, see generally
Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1472 (1989).
' Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681 (1984).
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model" of the Supreme Court. This model called for complete discretion
in the high Court to select the cases it would decide. The model also
offered the Justices a checklist for selecting cases appropriate and
deserving of Supreme Court review. In this way, the Supreme Court
would achieve its full potential as the manager of the system of federal
courts with the ultimate responsibility of developing a sound and
coherent body of national law."' The authors endorsed the existing
balkanized hegemony of national law, what some of us view as the
problem of intercircuit conflicts, and sought to recast it as one of the
system's strengths. The Supreme Court would manage its caseload so as
to allow conflicts in the federal law among the circuits to percolate before
granting review of an issue of national law. Only then would the high
Court decide and establish one rule for the nation.
The NYU Study further concluded that the general concern for
intercircuit conflicts was exaggerated and that there were in fact few
unresolved conflicts that were truly deserving of Supreme Court
attention. The authors rejected the capacity reform proposal to create a
new national appellate court to resolve conflicts.5 2 Instead, the authors
suggested detailed criteria that the Supreme Court should apply to
choose which cases to review. In addition, several suggestions were
offered to the Justices on how they might perform their task of case
selection more efficiently and more consistently."
As a matter of fact, in recent years the Rehnquist Court has been
granting review in substantially fewer cases than the Burger Court. 54 It
would be wholly speculative, however, to attribute this development to
the NYU Study. Still, one possible, even plausible, explanation is that
the current Justices have reached some kind of shared though
unarticulated consensus on case selection to reduce the role of the
Supreme Court.5 In part, the Justices may be giving up on trying to
51 ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 49, at 48-49.
52 Id. at 111-15.
53 See also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ. Press
1992) (proposing standards to which Supreme Court justices should be held in
communicating their interpretation of federal Constitution); Thomas E. Baker, The
Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court's Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as
Something We the People Can Understand, 10 CoNST. COMMENT. 167 (1993) (reviewing JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)).
Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. CT. REV.
403; see David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court's
Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARv. L. REv. 29
(1999).
' See sources cited supra note 54.
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resolve all conflicts that should be resolved. 6 Beyond this, not much
more can be said about the NYU Study because its primary focus was on
the Supreme Court and the Study only elliptically considered the courts
of appeals. But notice that its legislative recommendations would have
given over more discretion to the Justices and its other suggestions were
addressed to the exercise of the Justices' discretion. The reform package
would have strengthened, not weakened, the power and authority of the
Supreme Court.
IX. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMI1TEE ON FEDERAL
JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS
In 1989, the Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements of
the ABA (the "Standing Committee") issued a report entitled, The
United States Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process
After a Century of Growth. The Standing Committee examined the
numerous studies, reports and proposals for reform of the federal
appellate courts system since the American Bar Foundation study in
1968. The report went on to evaluate the history of congressional
legislative responses to increased appellate workload, such as increasing
the number of appellate judgeships, dividing the Fifth Circuit,
authorizing the limited en banc court in large circuits, and creating the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 9 The Standing Committee
made the same finding that previous studies had made: the seemingly
inexorable trend towards more appeals of greater complexity and
difficulty threatens to overwhelm the century-old federal appellate
structure. This group of bar leaders, jurists, and academic experts
trenchantly concluded that "reform of the courts of appeals will not be a
Intercircuit conflicts continue to accumulate and dissipate. Thomas Goldstein
counts fifteen to twenty, on average, each month in "Circuit Split Roundup," published in
U.S. Law Week. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and
Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PrIr. L. REv. 693 (1995) (describing method
by which Federal Courts Study Committee examined inability of Supreme Court to hear
unresolved intercircuit conflicts); Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit
Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 247 (examining impact
of circuit conflicts on practice of law); Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and
Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1029 (1999) (arguing that independence of
circuits contributes to unpredictability on appeal).
AMERICAN BAR Assoc., STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS,
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A
CENTURY OF GROwTH (1989) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMMITTEE].
See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
ABA STANDING COMMITrEE, supra note 57, at 25-28.
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question of whether, but a question of when and how."60 In general, the
Standing Committee urged continued study and monitoring of the
problems facing the courts of appeals, more emphasis on screening
procedures, and greater reliance on appellate subject matter
specialization. The final report offered four specific proposals.6 1 First,
the extent of the disuniformity among the courts of appeals should be
studied to consider whether cases ought to be allocated by subject matter
to non-regional courts with national jurisdiction. Second, the limited en
banc procedures followed in the larger courts of appeals might be
generalized to all the courts of appeals. Third, the idea of assigning
appeals to panels by subject matter ought to be studied. Fourth, the
intramural reforms for screening and deciding appeals with truncated
appellate procedures ought to be critically examined to guarantee the
preservation of the federal appellate ideal. The Standing Committee
emphasized the foundational importance of Article III judges "doing
justice on appeal."6 2
Perhaps the most important influence of the Standing Committee was
felt a year later in the work of the Federal Court Study Committee, which
is considered next. This, too, is a common phenomenon. Whatever
current commission or committee usually begins by going back to pick
up where the previous study left off. Judges and lawyers usually are
polled, and thus are obliged to look up from their day-to-day grind and
daydream about how their work could be done better or more efficiently.
When it is its turn, the most recent study or report dominates the
commentaries. For example, law reviews hold symposia. Often the
delivery of a study or report is the occasion for bills to be introduced in
Congress and for the judiciary committees to hold hearings. In short,
Id. at 40.
61 Id. at 41. The most recent resolutions of the ABA once again echo these same
concerns:
Resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the courts of appeals, both
federal and, state and territorial, to... provide in case dispositions (except in
those appeals the court determines to be wholly without merit), at a
minimum, ... reasoned explanations for their decisions.
Further Resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the Congress and
state and territorial legislatures to provide the courts of appeals with resources
that are sufficient to enable them to meet this responsibility.
American Bar Association, House of Delegates Report No. 8B, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/joumal/2000dailyjoumal8b.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2000).
" Id.
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one significant value, perhaps the principal value, of the experience we
have had with seriatim committees or commissions has been that some
episodic attention has been focused on the plight of the courts of appeals.
X. THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
In 1988, Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee (the
"Study Committee") as an ad hoc committee within the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 3 Appointed by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, the fifteen-person Study Committee included representatives
of the three branches of the federal government, state government
officials, practitioners, and academics.6' The Study Committee members
were thus broadly representative of the individuals and entities who
share a compelling interest in the work of the federal courts. The Study
Committee surveyed members of the federal judiciary and solicited the
views of citizens' groups, bar organizations, research groups, academics,
civil rights groups and others. Numerous public outreach meetings
were held and regional hearings focused on published proposals,
leading up to the Study Committee's Final Report. This is a typical set of
methodologies for these studies.
Congress gave the Study Committee a fifteen month deadline within
which to examine the problems facing the federal courts and to develop
a long term plan for the judiciary. The Study Committee followed the
typical pattern of these studies that is obvious to long time observers of
federal court reform. Congress established a statutory deadline that was
very brief; then there was some delay in appointing the members; then
the study group used a big part of its lifetime getting organized; then it
conducted its work considerably harried by its impending sunset
' Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4644 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331). See generally Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Courts
in the 21st Century, 15 NOVA L. REV. 105 (1991) (discussing committee's recommendations
for reorganizing federal courts); William K. Slate, Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee: An Update, 21 SEToN HALL L. REv. 336 (1991) (describing committee's
recommendations and Congress's response to them); Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal
Judiciary, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 751 (1992) (asserting new proposals for reform and criticizing
approaches of Congress and Weiss Commission); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Courts
Study Committee Begins Its Work, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 15 (1989) (explaining complexity of
issues before committee); Symposium, Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (collecting
articles that discuss pros and cons of issues facing committee); Symposium, The Federal
Court Docket: Issues & Solutions, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 615 (1990) (presenting opinions of leading
legal scholars about need for federal reform). This is the appropriate place to disclose that
the present author served as Associate Reporter to the Federal Courts Study Committee
(1989-90).
" See sources cited supra note 53.
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deadline. In the explicit charge to the Study Committee, Congress asked
for an evaluation of the structure and administration of the courts of
appeals. That section of the Study Committee's Final Report on
appellate structure is something akin to a Chinese restaurant menu of
structural reforms.
The Study Committee began this section of its Final Report with the
given that the federal appellate courts are faced with a "'crisis of
volume"' that will continue and that will eventually require some
"fundamental change."6 The Study Committee examined the present
geographic circuits to note a few essential characteristics that define their
current function: they are the only courts between the district courts and
the Supreme Court; their jurisdiction is an appeal as of right; their basic
decisional unit is the three-judge panel; they are geographically based;
and their total number of thirteen still reflects, though somewhat faintly,
the congressional history that once correlated the number of circuits to
the number of Supreme Court justices.6 The Study Committee's black-
letter recommendation reads: "Fundamental structural alternatives
deserve the careful attention of Congress, the courts, bar associations and
scholars over the next five years. The committee itself has studied
various structural alternatives. Without endorsing any, it lists a few here
to stimulate further inquiry and discussion."67 The list of structural
options may be briefly summarized for present purposes.
First, the present geographic circuits could be dissolved and new
circuit boundaries could be drawn and redrawn periodically to achieve
smaller regional courts with nine members.6 All the regional courts
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 109. The Federal Courts Study
Committee itself was divided over the seriousness of the appellate caseload crisis and
what, if anything, should be done about it. See id. at 123-24 (listing additional statement of
four members). One of the most prominent members of the Study Committee has gone
back and forth on the question. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS -
CRISIS AND REFORM 317 (1985) (concluding that "the wolf really seems to be at the door"),
with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 185 (1996)
(asking and answering "But is the system worse overall? I doubt it.").
'6 STUDY COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 113.
67 Id. at 116-17. The Study Committee did label changing the appeal-of-right feature of
appellate jurisdiction to a discretionary, certiorari-like, jurisdiction to be a "last resort." Id.
at 116. The Committee straightforwardly rejected the "single national appellate court"
proposal. Id. at 117. See generally Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a
New National Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1400 (1987) (arguing that alternatives to Intercircuit
Panel are inadequate to remedy courts' case overload and lack of uniformity). Presently, I
do not regret that the Study Committee sounded the death knell of that idea.
I STUDY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 118-19. See generally Alvin B. Rubin,
Views From the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448 (1976) (arguing that circuit courts are too
large to achieve uniform consensus on law).
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could be bound to follow the prior precedent of any other panel in every
other region, subject to Supreme Court overruling. One central division
of representative judges could review panel decisions and resolve
remaining conflicts as a kind of national en banc court. This would
reduce the expectation of more frequent conflicts generated by more
circuits without having to rely on the Supreme Court.
Second, an additional federal appellate tier could be created. Twenty
to thirty regional appellate divisions of nine judges each could be
created, replacing the present thirteen, to hear appeals as of right. In
addition, four or five upper-tier appellate courts could be created with
larger geographic regions to consider discretionary appeals from the
regional divisions, with Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear a second
discretionary appeal from the upper-tier courts. This structure could
absorb the anticipated large cohorts of additional judgeships in the
future and, again, would be able to handle the inevitability of more
frequent intercircuit conflicts.
Third, national subject matter courts could be created alongside the
present circuits with specialized national jurisdiction over such
recurring, common subjects as tax, admiralty, criminal, civil rights, labor,
administrative, and possibly other subjects.70 Alternatively, subject
matter panels could be created within the existing circuits.
Fourth, all the existing courts of appeals could be merged into a single
centrally-organized court. The central court would administratively
create and abolish special subject matter panels as appropriate. The new
organization could develop its own internal mechanisms for resolving
conflicts among panels.
71
Fifth, the existing circuits might be consolidated into perhaps five
"jumbo" circuits that might resemble in many ways the current Ninth
Circuit.7 There are many possible variations. For example, judges in the
. STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 119-20. See generally James A. Gazell, The
National Court of Appeals Controversy: An Emerging Negative Consensus, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1
(1986) (discussing long-standing controversy regarding best remedy to reduce Supreme
Court's growing caseload).
' STUDY COMMrlTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 120-21. See generally Daniel J. Meador, A
Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56
U. CH1. L. REv. 603, 607-11 (1989) (describing use of subject matter courts in foreign judicial
systems).
' STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 121. See generally Joseph F. Weis, Jr.,
Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits - A Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 455 (1995) (arguing that unified court of appeals would reduce Supreme Court caseload
without affecting its jurisdiction and would increase flexibility of circuit system).
2 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 122-23. See generally Arthur D. Hellman,
Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56
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jumbo circuits could rotate among specialized subject matter panels.
The Study Committee also noted several other particular proposals:
the Judicial Conference should develop a weighted caseload formula for
determining the need for additional appellate judgeships; the political
branches should expeditiously nominate and confirm judges to fill
existing vacancies; an in-depth study by the Judicial Conference of the
resources used to decide pro se litigation; congressional authorization of
the limited en banc device for all the circuits; and a Federal Judicial
Center study of the intramural reforms for case management already in
place in the circuits.7 3
Finally, the Study Committee urged serious attention and further
study of the problems of proposed fundamental structural reform of our
federal appellate system. This is a common finesse of study groups: to
come up with a list of themes and ideas that they deem merit further
study but that time and resources do not allow them to pursue in their
own effort. Items on these "someone-ought-to-take-a-look-at-this" lists
of things to do often show up later. Some enterprising professor takes
on the assignment in a law review. Or a successor committee or study
group makes the matter a priority for its staff.
XI. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT
Congress followed up on the Study Committee's recommendation for
a separate study of the courts of appeals with a provision in the Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990.7' That legislation
called on the Federal Judicial Center to "study the full range of structural
alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and submit a report on the
study to Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States." 76
In December 1993, the Federal Judicial Center completed still another
full-scale report on the alternative futures of the courts of appeals. That
report, entitled Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals ("Judicial Center Report"),77 examined the problems facing
U. Ci. L. REv. 541 (1989) (examining intracircuit inconsistency in Ninth Circuit).
7 STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-16.
74 Id. at 116-17.
's Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §
302(c), 104 Stat. 5104, 5104 (1990).
76 Id.
7 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1993) [hereinafter STRUCrURAL ALTERNATIVES]. The
author performed a literature review for the project. Id. at n.2.
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the federal appellate system. It is a detailed and comprehensive study of
the "stresses" (the report eschews the term "crisis") the circuit judges
and the courts of appeals are experiencing. 7 Thus, it rejects the
conclusions of some commentators and judges that the quantity of
appeals has already affected the quality of work product in the courts of
appeals. Still, the Judicial Center Report does sound a note of caution
that "[a]t some point, especially if the workload of the courts of appeals
continues to grow at its recent pace, changes in internal operating
procedures may not be sufficient for the task."79
The Judicial Center Report does admit to some concern for the future,
however, if the national policy choice is to maintain the existing federal
appellate structure. The Judicial Center Report concedes that in order to
restore traditional appellate procedures in all appeals, or even in only the
appeals fully decided on the merits, there must be either substantially
fewer appeals or some massive increase in the number of judges and
support personnel. The likelihood of either of those scenarios is left to
the reader's imagination. The body of the Judicial Center Report
expertly keeps the promise of the title of the report to canvass various
structural and other alternatives: total or partial consolidation; size
reduction; multiple tiers; discretionary appeals; differential case
management; district court error review; jurisdiction reduction; and
miscellaneous other nonjurisdictional options. However, the Judicial
Center Report comes down squarely on the side of non-structural
reforms and rigidly resists any more radical changes in the organization
and structure of the federal appellate court system "at this time.""'
Id. at 11.
Id. at 155. I believe that we are already past this point. Thomas E. Baker, Intramural
Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 913
(1995) (identifying and summarizing intramural reforms of various circuits); Thomas E.
Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might Do to Help
Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321 (1994) (discussing need for further reforms).
SSTRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 77, at 156.
" Id. at 155. Again, I disagree because I believe that we have reached the point that
structural reform is in order. See Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REv. 863 (1994) (discussing Congress' historical
methods to help federal courts with caseload problems); Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the
Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REv. 913 (1994) (evaluating
structural alternatives for federal courts).
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XII. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE LONG RANGE PLAN
In December 1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States
approved the report of an ad hoc committee entitled, Long Range Plan for
the Federal Courts (the "Long Range Plan").82 This initiative followed u
on another recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
Gazing into its crystal ball, the Long Range Planning Committee saw the
possibility of an alternative future that was neither desirable nor
acceptable: "In 2020 we may find a system of discretionary appellate
review, of oral argument in only the exceptional case, and of staff
personnel playing a dominant role in deciding the majority of the cases
or at least identifying the cases that get the full attention of the judges." 4
Instead, the Long Range Plan emphasized that considering fundamental
changes in the structure of the federal courts was prudent planning, but
structural changes should be pursued if and only if less fundamental
changes proved inadequate and structural alternatives became
absolutely necessary.85
For the most part, the third branch's long range plan for the courts of
appeals is nothing more than a portrait of the current arrangement. The
vision for the future is the image of the present. Consider the four bold
recommendations. First, the federal appellate function should continue
to be performed in the generalist courts of appeals, arrayed in
geographic regions, alongside the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit with its nationwide jurisdiction over certain subject matters. 8
Second, as far as is practicable, the workload of circuit judges should be
equalized nationally.87 Third, only the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates should have the responsibility to resolve intercircuit conflicts. 5
a2 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS (DECEMBER 1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. See generally Otto R. Skopil, Jr.,
Long Range Planning in the Federal Judiciary: Some Observations on a Work in Progress, 14 MISS.
C. L. REV. 199 (1994) (describing formation and mission of Comm-ittee). This is the place to
footnote that I was invited to attend an organizational meeting and give testimony to the
Committee. Thomas E. Baker, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Long Range Planning for the
Federal Judiciary, 23 T EX. TECH L. REV. 1, 1 (1992).
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 82, at 2-3.
" Id. at 20. I submit that the future is now, that the Committee's fearful prediction has
already come to pass. See generally Thomas E. Baker, The U.S. Courts of Appeals: Problems
and Solutions, 45 FED. LAWYER 31, 32-33 (1998) (describing way in which staff personnel
play dominant role in appellate process today).
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 82, at 140.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
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Fourth, actions by administrative agencies and Article I courts should be
reviewable directly in the courts of appeals, but when the initial review
is in the District Court any further review should be discretionary.9
On the prospect of more radical change, brought on by growing
caseload demands and increasing the size of the federal appellate bench,
the Long Range Plan was decidedly unenthusiastic:
Each court of appeals should comprise a number of judges sufficient
to maintain access to and excellence of federal appellate justice.
Circuit restructuring should occur only if compelling empirical
evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction
in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and
coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of increasing workload. 90
Thus, the official Long Range Plan is for the circuit judges to keep
things pretty much the same as things are for as long as they can, no
matter what. This is a common view among Article Ill judges. When a
study committee is dominated by members of the judiciary, the group's
report usually hews to the court party line.
But there are hydraulic pressures at work to call into question how
realistic it is for the federal judiciary to maintain the status quo
indefinitely into the future. For just two examples, consider the recent
debate whether to increase the number of federal judges dramatically to
meet caseload demands9 and the worrisome implications for federal
court workloads resulting from the federalization of the law in the
92United States. But recall that no less an icon of the federal bench than
Learned Hand once observed that federal judges as a species were
"curiously timid about innovations."93 Nevertheless, the courts of the
United States must serve "We the People" not "We the Judges."
' Id. at 46-47.
' Id. at 44; see also id. at 131-33 (discussing alternatives).
" See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT AND IMPLICATIONS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993)
(analyzing arguments for and against imposing cap on number of judgeships); see also J.
Harvie Wilkinson, [H, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147
(1994) (examining ways in which growth is compromising effectiveness of federal judicial
function).
" See generally WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Fed. Jud. Ctr.
1994) (presenting arguments for and against federalization of civil and criminal law and
examining several approaches to division of jurisdiction between federal and state courts).
I LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 158 (Irving DiUlliard ed., 1960).
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XIII. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
In December 1998, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals issued its Final Report to the President and
the Congress." The Final Report includes numerous provocative
proposals.95  Indeed, its major proposals already have been cut-and-
pasted into bills and congressional hearings have been held.96 Even a
brief summary of this most recent imagining of the future of the courts of
appeals reveals many leitmotifs borrowed from its long line of
predecessors.
For the last several years, many federal court-watchers, myself
included, have been instigating for a congressional commission to study
the courts of appeals that would be obliged to make specific legislative
recommendations for needed structural reform.9 The 105th Congress
created what has become popularly-known as the "White Commission,"
named after Justice Byron White, who served as its Chair. Congress
gave the Commission the statutory charge to perform three functions: (1)
study the present divisional lines of the judicial circuits; (2) study the
structure of the courts of appeals with particular reference to the Ninth
Circuit; and (3) report to the President and the Congress its
recommendations to further "the expeditious and effective disposition of
the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. " 98
The creation of the White Commission was basically the result of a
legislative stalemate between those in Congress who wanted to divide
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report (Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Final Report]. Citations to Final Report can be found at
http://app.comm.uscourts.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Hard copies of all cited Final
Report Documents are on file with the U.C. Davis Law Review. This portion of the
Chronology is adapted from Thomas E. Baker, Some Preliminary Comments on the Final
Report of the White Commission, 14 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2000). See also Carl Tobias, A
Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275 (1999) (noting
that commission issued report on December 18,1998).
s See generally Baker, supra note 94; Pamela Ann Rymer, Implications of the White
Commission, 34 U.C. DAvIs. L. REV. 351(2000).
See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing many recommendations for Final Report).
Thomas E. Baker, A Proposal that Congress Create a Commission on Federal Court
Structure, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 271 (1994).
Pub. L. 105-119, § 305(1)(B), 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997). See generally Carl Tobias, A
Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 281 (1996) (describing
commission's functions); Carl Tobias, An Analysis of Federal Appellate Court Study
Commissions, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 65, 70 (1996).
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the Ninth Circuit and those who did not.99 By statute, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist appointed the members: Associate Justice Byron
White (Chair); Judge Gilbert S. Merritt from the Sixth Circuit; Judge
Pamela Ann Rymer from the Ninth Circuit; Judge William D. Browning
from the District of Arizona; and N. Lee Cooper past president of the
American Bar Association.10 Professor Daniel J. Meador, University of
Virginia School of Law, served as Executive Director. 1'
The Commission reviewed the previous studies, developed statistical
data from the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of
United States Courts, and gathered new data directly from the courts of
appeals. 1 2  The Commission consulted experts' °3 and conducted
independent surveys of federal judges and lawyers who practiced before
the federal courts.10 4 Six public hearings were held l0s and nearly one-
hundred written statements were filed by interested parties in addition
to the formal testimonies delivered at the public hearings. 6 The
Commission circulated a Draft Report and received nearly eighty written
comments that prompted some important changes in the Final Report.
107
This was an Interneted effort: the Final Report, the earlier Draft Report
and all submitted comments, and all the testimony at the public hearings
with supporting documents are available on the Commission's Web
site."
The White Commission was specifically charged by Congress to make
some recommendations about the Ninth Circuit.10 9 It is important to
note, however, that the Commission did not recommend that Congress
split the Ninth Circuit. Instead, the Commission recommended
legislation reorganizing the Ninth Circuit into three regionally-based
' Final Report, supra note 94, at 1.
10 Id.
1 Id.
Id. at 3-4.
The author was among a "small number of law professors" invited to participate in
a research symposium with the members of the Commission and the staff. Id. at 3.
" Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Working
Papers 3-72 (July 1998).
Final Report, supra note 94, at 3.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 4.
108 See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
http://app.comm.uscourts.gov (providing links to Commission Reports) (last visited Nov.
16,2000).
10 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
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divisions." ° The White Commission's primary position is that dividing
the Ninth Circuit now would be counter-productive and splitting the
circuit is both impractical and unnecessary."' Furthermore, the
Commission believes that there are some good administrative reasons to
preserve the Ninth Circuit."2  Those arguments will not be rehearsed
here, except to note that the Commission emphasized the importance of
having a single body of federal decisional law across the western states
and the Pacific seaboard.13 Seemingly only for the sake of completeness,
the White Commission reviewed the pros and cons of three very
different realignment options without endorsing any of them, except to
say that each of them is flawed."4  The Final Report also concludes that
the dozen or so other approaches bandied about in the literature are
without any merit whatsoever.11
In a move that is sure to be as controversial as it is original and
provocative, the White Commission imagined an entirely new way to
deal with problems of more and more appeals and more and more
judges in the courts of appeals. The Commission drafted a proposed
statute to amend 28 U.S.C. § 46 to authorize any court of appeal with
more than fifteen judgeships to organize itself into adjudicatived... 116
divisions. This proposal would immediately apply to the two largest
regional courts of appeals: the Fifth Circuit (seventeen judges) and the
Sixth Circuit (sixteen judges)." 7 But more importantly, it would portend
110 Final Report, supra note 94, at 41-50.
1 Id. at 29-57.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 36. I am on record to take much the same position. Thomas E. Baker, On
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries - Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 917 (1990); see also Joseph N.
Akrotirianakis, Paul Garo Arshagouni & Zareh A. Jaltorossian, Jerry-Building the Road to the
Future: An Evaluation of the White Commission Report on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 355, 769 (1999) (noting commission recognized
benefit in maintaining single circuit); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 491 (1998) (arguing
reversal rate is not reason to split Ninth Circuit); Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A
Former Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875 (1998) (arguing
for Ninth Circuit split); Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU
L. REV. 583, 601 (1997) (arguing that Congress should keep Ninth Circuit intact).
114 Final Report, supra note 94, at 54-57.
115 Id. at 53. See generally Jennifer E. Spreng, Three Divisions in One Circuit? A Critique of
the Recommendations from the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 553 (1999) (criticizing proposals to split California between two
circuits).
16 Final Report, supra note 94, at 60-62,96-98 (Appendix C(2)).
117 Id. at 27 (Tables 2-9).
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the future for the rest of the courts of appeals as the growing appellate
caseload ineluctably increases pressure on Congress to create additional
circuit judgeships.
118
According to the White Commission, the particular details of the
divisional reorganization should be left to the judges in each circuit and
we should expect regional variations." 9 In fact, the Ninth Circuit judges
responded to the Draft Report of the Commission to suggest changes in
that earlier draft statute. But the Commission resisted this overture
and rejected the Ninth Circuit's suggestions as being inconsistent with
the Commission's concept of regional divisions. 12' The Commission
went on to describe in some particular statutory detail how the
divisional organization concept might work in the Ninth Circuit.
2
Therefore, the White Commission's blueprint for the Ninth Circuit
illustrates and illuminates our understanding of the novel concept of
reorganization of the circuits into regional divisions.123 1. • • 124
The Ninth Circuit would be divided into three regional divisions.
Each regional division would have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from the district courts within its region.1n A regional division would
function as a semi-autonomous appellate court sitting in panels.' 26 A
panel decision in one regional division would not be binding in another
regional division.127 Each regional division would have a divisional enbanc to rehear important cases or to reconsider a panel decision that
... BAKER, supra note *, at 232. See generally William M. Richman & William J. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 273 (1996) (recommending expansion in size of federal appellate
judiciary); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Oludgeships, 1 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37 (1999) (stating that increase in federal judgeships will restore
circuit courts to traditional model).
"' Final Report, supra note 94, at 61. A large majority of the senior and active judges on
the Ninth Circuit (25 of the 35 judges who voted) remained convinced that the White
Commission's regional division proposal is a bad idea and joined their Chief Judge in
opposition. Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Analysis of the Final Commission Report (1999)
(with May 6, 1999, cover letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., to Thomas E. Baker (on
file with author)). See generally Arthur D. Helman, The Unkindest Cut: The White
Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 377 (2000) (criticizing
White Commission proposal as uncompromising radical restructuring).
10 Final Report, supra note 94, at 56.
Id. at 51-52.
122 Id.
See id. at 40-47, 93-96 (Appendix C(1)).
124 See id. at 40-41, 93.
"z See id.
See id. at 43.
See id.
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creates a conflict with another regional division."8 Existing and still
binding Ninth Circuit precedents along with divisional panel decisions
could be overruled only within a division by the divisional en banc
procedure."5 The Commission further recommended the creation of
"Circuit Division" for conflict resolution to replace the present Ninth
Circuit limited en banc court."'3 The Circuit Division would have
discretionary jurisdiction only to resolve direct conflicts between or
among the three regional divisions.
Under the regional division organization, the appellate procedures
would be as follows. From the decision of the district court, there would
be an appeal-as-of-right before a three-judge panel of a "regional
division" followed by a petition for rehearing to the "divisional en banc
court."1 31 If and only if the decision created a conflict with a decision of
another regional division could there be a discretionary rehearing before
the "circuit division" for conflict resolution. 32 Otherwise, the next stop is
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court."' The Commission
proposed an eight year experiment with regional divisions in the Ninth
Circuit.134 At the end of the study period, the Federal Judicial Center
would report to the Judicial Conference, which would then recommend
to Congress whether the division arrangement should be continued with
or without modification. 135
Another of the White Commission's recommendations, one that gave
me a terrible frisson when I read it, is that Congress authorize the courts
of appeals to sit in two-judge panels, at least in some cases."6  The
expectation is that two-judge panels could decide those appeals clearly
controlled by well-settled precedent that presently are being decided
1 See id.
See id. at 43, 95.
See id. at 43, 93.
131 See id. at 45.
1 See id.
1 See id.
1 See id. at 95 (Appendix C).
' In my statement to the Commission on its Draft Report, I suggested that it would be
better to wait and see how this divisional concept plays out in the Ninth Circuit before
generalizing the experiment in the other courts of appeals and without further
compounding any Hawthorne effect that might result simply from obliging the other
circuits to implement their own peculiar variations of the concept. Statement of Thomas E.
Baker to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals on the
October 1998 Tentative Draft Report (Nov. 2, 1998), available at
http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/baker.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2000)
(on file with author).
" Final Report, supra note 94, at 62-64, 96-98 app. C(2).
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summarily without oral argument. Only if the two judges disagreed or if
they determined that there would be some advantage would they bring
in a third judge. Of course, the savings in judicial resources would not
be a full one-third; the reclaimed judge time would amount to the time
and effort the third judge now spends reading the briefs and conferring
with the other two panel members only in categories of the most
marginal appeals. The Commission further recommended a sunset
provision that after three years the Judicial Conference would decide
whether to recommend modifying or eliminating the two-judge panel
authority based on field studies conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center.
1 7
Perhaps the most original and the most intriguing idea the White
Commission developed is the proposal for District Court Appellate
Panels.13 The Commission proposed that each circuit be authorized to
create a "District Court Appellate Panel Service" on an experimental
basis. 39 Threejudge panels would consist of two district judges and one
circuit judge." District judges could not participate in appeals from
their own district.14' The district court appellate panels could hear only
appeals in designated categories; the Commission suggested diversity
cases and sentencing appeals."' Thereafter, there would be an appeal to
the court of appeals, but only with leave of the court.'" A district court
appellate panel could always transfer an appeal if it was determined to
involve a significant legal issue.'"
It is important to note that this proposal is not based on an assumption
that there presently is an excess supply of district court judgepower.
Rather more insightful, the Commission's rationale is that creating more
district judgeships at the base of the federal court pyramid would not
place additional strain on the organizational structure of the federal
court system. Additional district judges would actually be available to
do both appellate work and trial work as needed. 14 As with its other
statutory proposals, the White Commission recommends an eight year
experiment, monitored by the Federal Judicial Center, followed by a
1 Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64-66,98-99 app. C(3).
' Id. at 64.
"0 Id.
141 Id. at 65.
"I Id. at 64.
143 Id.
1 Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
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recommendation from the Judicial Conference to Congress whether to
continue, modify, or eliminate the district court appellate panel service.'46
The White Commission was not persuaded that it would be a good
idea to replace the statutory appeal-as-of-right'47 with an appellate
jurisdiction that was across the board discretionary.' However, the
White Commission's discussion of discretionary review is illuminating.
By distinguishing between the Supreme Court's certiorari authority and
what the Final Report labels the "Virginia type" of discretionary review,
the Commission has contributed an important clarification and focus
that will help inform future debate. 49
Everyone is familiar with the Supreme Court variety of discretionary
jurisdiction by way of the writ of certiorari. The Justices have an
unfettered discretion to take a case or to refuse to take a case on petition
and a refusal has absolutely no precedential effect.'' By contrast, the
more obscure Virginia variety of the writ has English common law roots
and is found today in the Virginia and West Virginia state court systems
as well as in the federal system in the United States Court of Appeals for
1 See generally Daniel J. Meador, Enlarging Federal Appellate Capacity Through District
Level Review, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233 (1998) (proposing establishment of new, first level of
limited review within trial court structure); Franklin S. Van Antwerpen, Jason H. Miller &
Adam J. Wasserman, Plugging Leaks in the Dike: A Proposal for the Use of Supplemental
Opinions in Federal Appeals, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1233 (1999) (advocating adoption of
procedure which would allow district judges to write opinions explaining trial court's
actions while appeal is pending). But see Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine,
Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by
Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351 (1995) (describing
and criticizing current practice of district judges sitting on appellate panels).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993) (setting forth automatic right to appeal all final decisions
of district courts of United States). See generally THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE
JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1989).
" See generally Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for
Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573 (1997)
(arguing that solution to volume crisis of federal courts of appeals is to decrease number of
cases that are filed in district courts or not to permit appeals from all final judgments);
Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J.
1151 (1981) (contending that because federal appellate courts are so overburdened, time has
come to ponder question of exercising discretionary jurisdiction); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290 (1996)
(asserting that expansion of number of judgeships will best resolve rapidly growing
caseload).
', Final Report, supra note 94, at 70-72.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1993) (conferring Supreme Court review by writ of
certiorari for federal courts of appeals and state supreme courts respectively).
"I Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950), denying cert. to
Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949).
University of California, Davis
the Armed Services."' The Virginia variety of the writ involves
discretion of a different kind: the appellate determination to grant or
deny leave to appeal contemplates an examination of the merits and a
denial means that the appeal does not present an issue of reversible
error.15 Arguably, this second variety is more compatible with the
history and tradition of the courts of appeals.
Thus, the White Commission has now taken its place at the end of the
long line of studies of the courts of appeals. It has advanced the debate
in many of its particulars. As was true of its predecessors, and as will be
true of its probable successors, the White Commission gave us some
ideas that were old, some ideas that were new, some ideas that were
borrowed, and some ideas that really blew. What should become of these
ideas is the subject of this Symposium. What will become of these ideas
is up to the Congress.
A PERSONAL POSTSCRIPT
The rest of this most excellent Symposium considers the White
Commission Final Report, so I have reached the end of this Chronology,
at least for now. I am confident, however, that what is past is prologue.
Most likely some as-yet-to-be-named committee or commission will line
up next, behind these others, and take its turn and place its report on the
courts of appeals' bookshelf.' 4 As someone who first got in this line
back in 1981"5 and who over the years since has stood alongside the
NYU Study,'5 the Federal Courts Study Committee,1 17 the Federal
Judicial Center Report,' the Judicial Conference Long Range Plan, 9 and
the White Commission,16° I have come to appreciate the perspicacity of
Arthur T. Vanderbilt's oft-quoted cich6 that "judicial reform is no sport
152 Final Report, supra note 94, at 71.
Id. I believe that the intramural procedural shortcuts already establish a de facto, if
not a de jure, system of discretionary appellate jurisdiction that violates the spirit, if not the
letter of the appeal-as-of-right statute. See Baker, supra note 84, at 33.
"' See Thomas E. Baker, 2020 Year-end Report on the Judiciary by the Chief Justice of the
United States, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 861 (1997) (predicting changes that will occur in federal court
system in first two decades of twenty-first century).
15 Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35
Sw. L. J. 687 (1981).
15 See supra note 49.
See supra note 63.
" See supra note 77.
1 See supra note 82.
1 See supra note 103.
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for the short-winded."1 61
"' MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO
WHICH THE STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY xix (Arthur
T. Vanderbilt ed. 1949). See generally Alan V. Lowenstein, The Legacy of Arthur T. Vanderbilt
to the New Jersey Bar, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 1319 (1999) (discussing important contributions to
American jurisprudence made by Arthur T. Vanderbilt).

